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quickly and diligently as possible and make a record of all external
impediments (denial of discovery, the lack of timely discovery by the
Commonwealth, governmentconcealment ofevidence, insufficient time
for meaningful investigation) so that claims will not be defaulted and
there will remain at least a chance that facts may be further developed in

federal court. On a final note, McCleskey and George make clear that any
claim with a mere scintilla of evidence to support it must be included at
every stage of collateral review.
Summary and analysis by:
Deborah A. Hill

BUCHANAN v. ANGELONE
103 F.3d 344 (4th Cir. 1996)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit

FACTS

HOLDING

On September 15, 1987, Douglas McArthur Buchanan, Jr. brought
his rifle to his father's house. After an argument about his natural mother,
the defendant shot his father through the back of the head. Then he waited
for his two half-brothers to return home from school. Upon their arrival,
Buchanan shot both brothers. One died. The other survived the shooting,
but Buchanan subsequently stabbed him to death with a kitchen knife.
When his step-mother later arrived at the home, Buchanan attempted to
shoot her. Unsuccessful, he resorted to stabbing her with the kitchen
knife, delivering lethal wounds to her neck. 1
The Commonwealth charged Buchanan with capital murder of
'more than one person as part of the same act or transaction." 2 A grand
jury issued four separate indictments for first degree murder.3 Buchanan
4
also faced four counts of using a firearm in the commission of a murder.
At the end of his trial in Amherst County, ajury found Buchanan guilty
on all charges and sentenced him to death for the capital murder of his
father. 5
Buchanan exhausted his direct appeal and state habeas proceedings.
He then filed apetition fora writ of habeas corpus in federal district court.
6
The court denied relief and Buchanan appealed.

The court of appeals found no error in the district court's denial of
Buchanan's petition for a writ of habeas corpus and affirmed its judg7
ment.

I Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 389, 394-95, 384 S.E.2d
(1989).
757, 760-61
2
Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(7).
3Va. Code Ann.§ 18.2-32.
4 Va. Code Ann § 18.2-53.1.
5Buchanan v. Angelone, 103 F.3d 344, 346-47 (1996). Although
not expressly stated in the opinion, or in the opinion of the Supreme Court
of Virginia, the jury appears to have predicated Buchanan's death
sentence on a finding of "vileness".
6Id.at 347.
7
Id. at 351.
8
Three ofthe court's rulings will not be discussed in this summary.
Some of the rulings provide little if any guidance because they apply
broad, settled principles of law to facts that are specific to the case being
reviewed. These holdings are (1) trial counsel was not ineffective by not
suggesting the defendant plead guilty to the first degree murder indictments so that double jeopardy would preclude a sentence of death. The
court correctly applied the holding of Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493
(1984), that pleading guilty to the lesser included offenses does not bar
the state from prosecuting the greater offenses if it brought all charges in

the same prosecution; (2) the Supreme Court of Virginia conducted a
sufficient proportionality review; (3) having failed to raise the issue on
direct appeal, Buchanan was barred from assigning error for the trial
court's failure to instruct on second degree murder.
9
Buchanan, 103 F.3d at 347. Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(B) states:

ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I.

Inadequate Instruction Regarding Mitigating Evidence
A.

A General Instruction Failed to Guide the Jury's
Discretion

In the first of his five claims, 8 Buchanan alleged that the trial court
inadequately instructed the jury about mitigating evidence by refusing to
give specific and detailed instructions regarding mitigating evidence as
defined in Va. Code Ann § 19.2-264.4, such as his youth, absence of prior
criminal record, and the influence of an extreme mental or emotional
disturbance.9 Instead, the trial court instructed thejury, "[I]f you believe
from all the evidence that the death penalty is not justified, then you shall
fix the punishment of the defendant at life imprisonment." 10 The court

"Facts in mitigation may include, but shall not be limited to,
the following: (i) The defendant has no significant history of
prior criminal activity, (ii) the capital felony was committed
while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental
or emotional disturbance, (iii) the victim was a participant in
the defendant's conduct or consented to the act, (iv) at the time
of the commission of the capital felony, the capacity of the
defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired, (v) the age of the defendant at the time of the
commission of the capital offense or (vi) mental retardation of
the defendant."
10 1d.
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of appeals also noted that the verdict form required the jury to indicate
that it had considered the mitigation evidence. It
Buchanan made two arguments concerning the trial court's instruction about mitigation evidence. He first alleged that the court's general
instruction failed to channel the jury's discretion, subjecting him to an
arbitrary and capricious sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
The court of appeals held that the Eighth Amendment does not mandate
specific standards forjury instructions on mitigating evidence. 12 So long
13
as juries are able to consider "all relevant mitigating evidence,
Virginia's sentencing procedure satisfies the Eighth Amendment requirement of individualized consideration in sentencing. Failure to
require that judges instruct the jury as to statutory mitigating factors, the
court held, does not render Virginia's death penalty scheme unconstitutional. 14 Accordingly, the court of appeals found no merit to Buchanan's
Eighth Amendment claim.
Virginia's death penalty sentencing statute does not require that a
trial judge specifically instruct ajury about statutorily defined mitigating
factors. Nevertheless, a trial court's failure to provide such instructions
arguably violates a defendant's rights under the Eighth Amendment. The
decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Mills v. Maryland15 and
McKoy v. North Carolina,16 are instructional, though they address issues
that are only analogous. In those cases, as in Virginia, no procedural bar
prevented the defendants from presenting mitigating evidence and juries
were not flatly barred from considering it. Nevertheless, the Court
condemned procedural "barriers" to the consideration ofmitigation. 17 In
Mills, the Court stated,
Under our decisions, it is not relevant whether the barrier to the
sentencer's consideration of all mitigating evidence is interposed by statute ... by the sentencing court ... or by an
Because the [sentencer's] failure to
evidentiary ruling ....
consider all of the mitigating evidence risks erroneous imposition of the death sentence.., it is our duty to remand for
18
resentencing."
Similarly, the Court has held that jurors must be permitted to give
effect to mitigating evidence if they choose to do so. 19 While no court has
conclusively determined the issue, a trial court's refusal to instruct the
jury on specific mitigating factors may place an unconstitutional barrier
to the jury's meaningful consideration of mitigating evidence and may
impede the jury's opportunity to give effect to it. Under a general
instruction, a jury is not instructed on how the mitigating evidence
presented to it relates to their duties under the capital sentencing statute.
There is a substantial risk that mitigating evidence will not be considered
according to law without guidance from the trial court. Lower federal
-ourts have held that the Constitution forbids the reasonable possibility
'hat a juror may not understand the meaning and function of a mitigating
Factor.20 As a potential barrier that prevents jurors from considering
mitigating evidence, a trial court's failure to provide instructions on
;tatutorily defined mitigating factors may violate the Eighth Amend-

I I d.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 348.
14 Id. at 347(citing Clozza v. Murray, 913 F.2d 1092, 1105 (4th Cir.
1990)).
15 486 U.S. 367 (1988).
16494 U.S. 433 (1990).
17
Mills, 486 U.S. at 375.
18 Id.(citations omitted).
19
See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), and Pemy v.
"ynaugh,492 U.S. 302 (1989).

ment. In any event, many circuit court judges are willing to give proffered
mitigating instructions and counsel should continue to make that effort.
B.

A General Instruction Denies a Defendant His Rights
Under Virginia's Sentencing Statute

Buchanan also alleged that the general mitigation instruction violated Virginia's death penalty sentencing statute, thereby denying him
any benefit provided by the statute. The defendant argued that this denial
of rights under state law amounted to a violation of the Due Process
Clause of the United States Constitution. 2 1 The court of appeals, while
treating Buchanan's claim as a federal issue, dismissed the claim on its
merits. While the court agreed that the denial of a state procedural right
may rise to the level of a federal due process violation, the court held that
the Virginia statute only assures that a defendant has a right to present
mitigating evidence. 22 The statute does not require the trial court to
provide jury instructions regarding specific mitigating factors. Finding
that the trial court's instruction was not inconsistent with the Virginia
23
statute, the court of appeals rejected Buchanan's due process claim.
The court's resolution of Buchanan's claim, based on the absence
of any express language, leaves open the question of whether Buchanan
had a due process right to have the jury informed of mitigating factors
deemed significant by the legislature, and in support of which he had
offered evidence. Section 19.2-264.4 sets forth several statutory mitigating factors. Because the legislature codified the factors, it must have
recognized them to be significant in the sentencing process. Arguably,
these specific mitigating factors represent items the legislature believed
to be particularly relevant to consideration of a sentence other than death.
If not, the legislature could have codified a general mandate that the
defendant could introduce mitigating evidence. At a minimum, the
enumerated mitigating factors are beneficial sentencing considerations
that the legislature provided to capital defendants. The trial court's
failure to instruct the jury about these statutory mitigating factors
prevented the jury from learning the importance the legislature assigned
to them. Furthermore, it may have negated the legislature's attempt to
make the death sentencing procedure comport with the Eighth Amendment. While it is true that there is no language in the statute commanding
an instruction, the statutory scheme is frustrated when the trial court
refuses to assist the jury in giving effect to evidence that addresses the
statutory mitigating factors.
The general instruction in Buchanan's case is a standard instruction
given to juries after the presentation of a case in mitigation. Nevertheless,
the instruction may be inconsistent with the statutory scheme. The
Virginia statute does not create a presumption in favor or against a
sentence of death. The statute states that "a proceeding shall be held
which shall be limited to a determination as to whether the defendant
shall be sentenced to death or life imprisonment." 24 Yet, the trial court
instructed, "[I]f you believe from all the evidence that the death penalty
is not justified .... ,,25 The instruction suggests that a death sentence is
presumed unless evidence is available to show that it is unreasonable.

20

Peek v. Kemp, 784 F.2d 1479 (1 lth Cir. 1986). See also Andrews
v. Shulsen, 802 F.2d 1256, 1264 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding that "jury
should be instructed that law recognizes circumstances which may be
considered as extenuating or otherwise reducing a defendant's culpability and hence his punishment.").
21 Buchanan, 103 F.3d at 348.
22 Id.

23Id.
24
Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(A) (1995).
25
Buchanan, 103 F.3d at 347 (emphasis added).
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The creation of this presumption is contrary to the statutory sentencing
scheme.
The Supreme Court of Virginia's holding in Smith v. Commonwealth26 mandates that ajury can recommend a life term even when the
Commonwealth established either or both aggravating factors. Arguably, a defendant enjoys a benefit under the sentencing statute that the
jury may elect to recommend life despite finding "future dangerousness"
or "vileness." It can suggest a life sentence for any reason at all. Yet, the
instruction given by the trial court instructs the jury that they can make
such a recommendation only if it finds the death penalty is not justified.
The suggestion of such a precondition to a recommendation of life
arguably denies a defendant a state created right and violates the Due
Process Clause. Counsel may wish to consider proposing a substitution
of the word "appropriate" for"justified" and preserve the issue for appeal
if the trial court denies the request.
H.

Exclusion of Expert Testimony in Sentencing Phase as
Hearsay

During the sentencing proceedings, Buchanan relied on his expert,
Dr. Robert Brown, as the primary mitigation witness. Dr. Brown testified
that Buchanan was under "extreme emotional stress at the time of the
killings."'27 The trial court did not allow Dr. Brown to provide the basis
for his opinion by repeating statements others made to him during his
investigation, ruling statements made by persons not at trial were
28
inadmissible hearsay.
Buchanan claimed that the trial judge's application of the hearsay
rule violated his constitutional right to present mitigating evidence. 29
Buchanan relied on the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Green
v. Georgia.30 In Green, the Supreme Court considered the statement of
an inmate already convicted of capital murder to the effect that he acted
alone, exonerating his co-defendant. 3 1 The Court held that because the
testimony was "highly relevant to a critical issue in the punishment
phase," the trial court could not employ the hearsay rule "'to defeat the
ends of justice."' 32 Although the application of the hearsay rule was
proper, the unique circumstance made the use of the hearsay rule during
the sentencing phase a violation of the Due Process Clause.
The court of appeals found that the facts in Buchanan's case were
meaningfully different from those in Green. The court noted that in
Green, the evidence spoke to the innocence of the defendant. In addition,
the statement in Green was made against the utterer's penal interest,

26219 Va. 455,248 S.E.2d 135 (1978).
27
Buchanan, 103 F.3d at 348.
28
Id.
29 Id.
30442 U.S. 95 (1979).
31 Id. at 96-97.
32
Id. at 97 (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302
(1973)).
33
Buchanan, 103 F.3d at 349.
34 Charles Friend, The Law of Evidence in Virginia § 212, n.35
(Supp. 1992).

giving the statement inherent reliability. The statements made to Dr.
Brown addressed the defendant's emotional suffering and not his innocence. Furthermore, they lacked any indicia of reliability. Given the
different circumstances in Buchanan's case, the court held that "[t]he
exclusion of the hearsay statements offered by Dr. Brown [did] not fit
'33
within the narrow exception recognized by Green.
It is not clear from the opinion whether the trial court allowed Dr.
Brown to at least state the number and identity of the persons he
interviewed who provided the basis for his opinion. An expert's testimony and its effectiveness are severely undercut if she cannot substantiate her conclusion because a jury would have difficulty in giving
weight to the expert's testimony. 34 For instance, an expert's conclusion
that the defendant does well in a structured environment will appear
unfounded unless she can identify her sources of information such as
fellow prisoners and prison officials. At the other extreme, the court of
appeals was probably correct that expert witnesses cannot use summations of out of court statements as a basis for their opinion. However,
under Virginia law, trial courts should permit an expert witness to state
the identity of a source of information while forbidding the expert from
relating the source's testimony. 35 Allowing witnesses to name their
sources allows them to legitimate their conclusions without running
afoul of the prohibition against hearsay evidence.
The trial court offered defense counsel the opportunity to present
the in-court testimony of the witnesses Dr. Brown would have spoken
36
about. Counsel declined this chance to present non-expert testimony.
While the exact circumstances are unknown, an excellent opportunity to
introduce testimony that may have been effective could have been
missed. Lay witnesses, such as co-workers and correctional officers, can
deliver information to the jury without having to overcome thesuspicion
of bias that accompanies expert testimony. For instance, a jury may be
more likely to believe a correctional officer who testifies that when she
knew the defendant as a prisoner, he posed no danger to himself or others
and appeared to do well in a structured environment. Often a jury may
view the expert as a hired gun, placing an additional burden on the
defense. The Virginia Capital Clearinghouse recommends that practitioners strongly consider using lay witnesses when presenting their case in
37
mitigation, alone or in conjunction with expert testimony.
Summary and Analysis by:
David T. Mclndoe

35

Id.Friend notes that while the Supreme Court ofVirginia has not
made an affirmative declaration that experts may disclose the identity
and number of their sources, the current common law suggests such a
rule.
36
Buchanan, 103 F.3d at 348.
37 See case summary of Stout v. Netherland, Capital Defense
Journal, this issue, for a discussion of the use of lay witnesses.

